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Introduction: 
In response to the Nazi invasion of the USSR on 22nd June 1941, the British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill a veteran anti-Bolshevik, declared his support for the USSR. That same 
evening Churchill broadcast on BBC radio, declaring that, ‘Any man or State who fights 
Nazism will have our aid.’ Further that Hitler’s ‘invasion of Russia is no more than a prelude 
to an attempted invasion of the British Isles’ and that, ‘The Russian danger is therefore our 
danger and the danger of the United States just as the cause of any Russian fighting for his 
hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe 
[8].’ On 12th July 1941 the British and Soviet foreign ministers Sir Stafford Cripps and 
Vyacheslav Molotov, signed an Anglo-Soviet Agreement in Moscow. A Pathé newsreel of the 
signing shown in British cinemas, described the agreement as ‘common-sense’ [14]. 
Analyses of Anglo-Soviet relations during World War II tend to focus on intergovernmental 
relations and how the common enemy of Nazi Germany pushed these rival states into a 
temporary alliance. Curtis Keeble, HM Ambassador to the USSR, 1978-82 argues that, ‘The 
bond between Britain and the Soviet Union, in so far as it existed, depended upon the 
common enemy and dissolved with his defeat [15, P. 168].’ Britain, the Soviet Union and 
later the USA formed a grand alliance to defeat Nazi Germany, but the alliance was fraught 
with tensions, distrust of each other’s wartime aims and post-war ambitions [11]. 
 
While governments form alliances, sign treaties and deploy military forces, they need their 
citizens to at the very least to work in the factories and on the farms and to fight. Therefore 
rather than examine the motivations for and the twists and turns of intergovernmental 
relations, this study will examine how the Anglo-Soviet alliance was explained and promoted 
to the British public and how public opinion viewed the alliance. Some academic research 
has already been undertaken on this topic. For example, Martin Kitchen in his, British Policy 
towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War cites a public opinion survey 
conducted just after the German invasion of the USSR, which showed British public opinion 
strongly favoured the closest possible cooperation with the Soviets. Home Intelligence 
Weekly Reports, revealed concern that Russia was fighting the war for Britain with 
insufficient help and that there were widespread complaints that there was not nearly as 
much enthusiasm at the top to help the Soviet Union as there was among the working class 
[16, P.100]. The most comprehensive study of British war-time public opinion is provided by 
P. M. H. Bell in his John Bull and the Bear. Bell uses the data gathered by the Ministry of 
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Information (MoI) to analyse the development of British public opinion about the Soviet 
Union 1941-45 and provides case studies such as British public opinion on the finding of the 
Katyn graves in 1943 [5].  
 
This study digs a little deeper and rather than use the war-time Public Opinion Reports that 
were pulled together from information gathered all over the country, it instead focuses on 
one city – Manchester. Manchester was a port city, a major population and industrial 
centre, and as such was crucial to the British war effort. Weapons and equipment produced 
in Manchester were also transported to the USSR on the arctic convoys that made the 
perilous journey to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. During WWII the MoI in London stood at 
the apex of a structure that oversaw the dissemination of government-approved 
information about the war. Information about public opinion concerning all aspects of the 
war flowed back up the MoI structure to London. The MoI’s activities, meetings, documents 
and reports, including its public opinion reports were all confidential during the war [30].The 
papers relating to the MoI’s Manchester Information Committee (MIC) are held in the 
Manchester archives, which are now stored in salt mines just outside the city [i]. The 
documents have been analysed to create an understanding of how the British government’s 
national information campaign to promote the Anglo-Soviet alliance was carried out in 
Manchester and to develop a picture of how Mancunians (the inhabitants of Manchester) 
viewed the USSR. The examination in this study of Mancunians’ opinions about the USSR 
(which is usually called Russia in the war time documents) and calls for a second front in 
Europe focuses on 1942 and early 1943 as public opinion reports after this date were not 
found in the Manchester archives.  This study is there linking the local – Manchester, with 
the national – Great Britain, and also with the international – the USSR. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
The Ministry of Information: From London to the localities. 
As the international situation deteriorated in the mid-1930s, the British government began 
to draw up plans for a Ministry of Information (MoI). For Britain WWII began at 11am on 3rd 
September 1939 and the following day the MoI was formed; it was charged with ‘news and 
press censorship; home publicity; and overseas publicity in Allied and neutral countries [2].’ 
The MoI issued guidance to the media although within the constraints of war-time 
censorship, there was still room for editorial freedom and varying interpretations of the 
progress of the war. The main exception was the Communist Party newspaper The Daily 
Worker, which was banned in January 1941 for its continued opposition to the war. ‘D’ or 
defence notices were used to prevent the publication of militarily sensitive information. The 
MoI worked closely with the BBC, which tended to present the facts and to avoid comment. 
From 1940, the novelist and playwright J. B. Priestley became the voice of the nation with 
his hugely popular, inspirational talks called Postscripts, which were broadcast on the BBC 
after the evening news [36]. Initially the MoI’s domestic propaganda did not always strike 
the right note with the British public, its poster with the slogan Keep Calm and Carry On was 
widely viewed as patronising [7, P. 18]. The MoI also experienced rapid changes in ministers, 
until Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook who was a newspaper proprietor and the minister of 
supplies, persuaded their close friend the Conservative MP Brendan Bracken to become MoI 
minister. Bracken also had newspaper experience as the publisher of the Financial Times 
and the Economist, he served as minister of information from 20 July 1941-25 May 1945. 
Cyril Radcliffe a leading lawyer was appointed MoI’s director general and Francis Williams as 
head of censorship. Williams was the former editor of the Labour Party supporting 
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newspaper the Daily Herald. Before WWII the Daily Herald had been resolutely anti-Stalinist 
and had condemned both the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Winter War with Finland [9]. 
 
The MoI in London stood at the head of a hierarchical structure; it appointed Regional 
Information Officers (RIO) to head the new MoI Regional Advisory Committees (RACs), 
which were organised in the country’s twelve defence regions. The RACs were composed of 
community representatives and persons connected to the local political authorities such as 
county, town and city councils. In their turn the RIOs set up and appointed members to 
Information Committees (ICs), which were the next level down in the MoI structure and 
were usually based on parliamentary areas [25 P. 1-2]. The Manchester IC was located 
within the North-Western RAC and reported to the RIO Mr G. Mould and his deputy T. J. 
Hunt.  ICs could also form district or functionally-based sub-committees, the latter might for 
example focus on organising MoI film shows or dealing with emergency situations. The 
Manchester IC had Central, Northern, Eastern and Southern Divisional Committees (DCs) as 
well as a Wythenshawe DC for the area to the south of the river Mersey [26]. 
 
The decision to set up DCs in Manchester was taken at an MIC meeting in March 1942. It 
was felt that Manchester was simply too large, ‘to get the fullest value from the services 
offered by the Ministry of Information [31]. That while smaller towns were holding meetings 
addressed by speakers of national and even international reputation, documentaries and 
films. ‘Apart from mass meetings in Belle Vue little if any work of this nature has been 
attempted so far in Manchester. . . A central body like the Manchester Information 
Committee is not in sufficiently close touch with the districts of Manchester to organise 
these lectures, etc. for smaller suburban audiences . . . [31].“Typically the heads of the new 
DCs were local councillors and the honorary secretaries worked in libraries. The DCs were 
also expected to have two members from each of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
parties as well as from the Church of England, Free Churches, Roman Catholic Church and 
Jews. Each DC could also recommend other committee members subject to approval by the 
MoI.  
 
The most important members of the ICs were the local civic leaders who provided both a 
connection with the local area and a figure head for the committee. The ICs were expected 
to maintain a ‘strictly non-party attitude to all questions [25, P. 2].’  and to include at least 
two members of the main political parties; persons associated with important movements 
and welfare organisations and could also recruit those ‘conspicuous in public work chosen 
on their own merits [25, P. 2].  A typical IC might have 20 members representing the local 
authorities, political parties, churches, trade unions, local press, chambers of trade or 
commerce, voluntary welfare societies, women’s organisations, education and special 
interests such as youth. The ICs and their sub-committees had the vital role of disseminating 
the government information that had been transmitted to them from the MoI. They were 
expected to carry out this role not just in ‘normal’ or quiet periods, but after severe raids 
and similar circumstances. . . . [30].’ Confidential guidance for IC members advised that, ‘The 
Ministry of Information is responsible for stimulating the collective effort for victory and 
assisting to maintain the confidence of the people. In this country, the feelings, opinions and 
endeavours of the community depend on the people themselves, but the Ministry can help 
by publishing information, and assisting the public in understanding the issues at stake, and 
by keeping in touch with the trends of public opinion and feeling [25, P. 1].’  
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The role of the ICs was therefore not just to be a channel for centrally-devised information 
but also to help make this information relevant and accessible to local people. As the 
guidance for ICs notes, ‘success will depend on adapting the work of the Ministry to the 
needs of the people in different localities [25, P. 1].’ and that, ‘The principal function of the 
Information Committee is to be a link connecting the Ministry with the people of the 
locality. . .  [that the] . . . Committee will keep in touch with the public and will assist in 
maintaining the spirit of the community. They will help the population to resist the invasion 
of the mind, the chief aim of enemy propaganda [25, P. 3]. The ICs were therefore required 
to produce regular reports for the RIO on trends in public opinion, harmful rumours, and on 
issues likely to affect public opinion, which required a remedy or an explanation [25, P. 5]. 
Such issues might concern the conduct and progress of the war, the distribution and 
availability of goods, food; transport and other local difficulties [30]. If the ICs identified an 
alarmist or malicious rumour circulating they were expected to inform the RIO immediately. 
The ICs were also required to liaise with the RIO about what public meetings, lectures, 
speakers, posters, exhibitions, and films were needed in their area. In their turn the RIOs fed 
digests of this information to the MoI in London. 
 
The Ministry of Information and the Anglo-Soviet Alliance. 
The Anglo-Soviet war-time alliance brought a new dimension to the MoI’s work: selling the 
USSR to the British people. A Russian Relations Division or Russian desk was set up within 
the MoI’s Foreign Publicity Division and was charged with overseeing the coverage of the 
USSR in the British media and producing materials to be used by the RACs and ICs. Bracken 
needed someone with knowledge of the USSR and journalistic experience to head the 
Russian desk; to change the image of Stalin from a tyrant and appeaser of Hitler to ‘Uncle 
Joe’, Britain’s friend. Although it was not known at the time, Peter Smollett who was 
appointed by Bracken to head the Russian desk was a soviet agent. He was born Hans Peter 
Smolka in Vienna in 1912, settled in London in 1933, became a British national in 1938 and 
anglicised his name to (Harry) Peter Smollett. In the 1930s, while working as a journalist for 
the News Chronicle and The Times, he had been granted unique access for a foreigner to the 
USSR’s Polar Regions. He wrote a series of extremely positive articles about the USSR for 
The Times and then a book entitled, Forty Thousand Against the Arctic, which was published 
in 1936. Smollett’s entry in the UK National Archives now notes that during the war, ‘his 
pro-Soviet sympathies were on record’ and that he was later, ‘assessed to have been 
implicated in Soviet espionage between (at least) 1930 and 1945’ and certainly knew the 
soviet spy, Kim Philby in 1930s [38]. 
 
At the MoI Smollett had two priorities to, ‘combat anti-Soviet feelings in Britain’ and ‘to 
attempt to curb exuberant pro-Soviet propaganda that might seriously embarrass the 
government [12].’ To do this Smollett decided to keep, ‘Russian-accented and openly 
partisan apologists at bay’ and to use ‘sympathetic British commentators instead [12].’ Guy 
Burgess [13] who would later be revealed as a soviet spy was a senior BBC producer at the 
time and he worked with Smollett to ensure that soviet materials were broadcast. 
Unsurprisingly, Ivan Maisky, the soviet ambassador (1932-43) promised Bracken that he 
would help Smollett and he also worked with the BBC to promote the Anglo-Soviet alliance. 
An internal BBC memo reveals that Maisky and Lady Violet Bonham Carter who was a BBC 
governor, agreed that the best way to present the USSR was to stress its cultural 
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achievements rather than its political history [4]. Maisky and his wife Agniya toured the 
country and appeared in Pathé newsreels shown in British cinemas, one such film was about 
the Tanks for Russia week in September 1941, when all one week’s tank production was for 
Russia. The film showed Maisky addressing workers at a British tank factory standing by a 
tank named Stalin [33]. The cinema newsreels typically stressed the vital nature of the 
alliance to both countries and often included footage provided by the USSR [11]. 
 
During WWII at a time before TVs were commonplace, radio broadcasts and cinema ii were 
powerful means of mass communication. The MoI had a stock of films which could be 
shown during Anglo-Russian Friendship weeks. These included: A Day on the Soviet Front, 
Abundant Harvest, Odessa Besieged, Soviet Women, Salute to the Soviet, Daghestan, and A 
day in Soviet Russia. The MoI did not lend films to be included in the ordinary cinema 
programmes, instead preferring to put together a programme of their own, including films 
about the Russian scene with films about the British contribution to the war effort such as, 
Merchant Seamen and Food Convoy. The MoI would help local ICs to pay for cinema hire 
and publicity for such programmes and would also loan films to the charitable Aid to Russia 
Committees [29]. The BBC broadcast Shostakovich’s Leningrad (Seventh) symphony to mark 
the first anniversary of the USSR’s entry into the war; a special broadcast dedicated to 
Stalingrad to mark the 25th anniversary of the Revolution in 1942; the 7th November 1943 
was celebrated in the UK as Soviet National Day and the following evening’s BBC broadcasts 
were in Honour of Russia. For Red Army Day in 1944 the BBC broadcast the reassuringly 
British-accented Poet Laureate John Masefield reading Ode to the Red Army and in 
December 1944 broadcast the premiere of Prokofiev’s Toast to Stalin to mark Stalin’s 
birthday.  
 
Smollett also organised events throughout the country such as the celebration of the 25th 
anniversary of the formation of the Red Army in 1943. Cinemas showed a short Pathé film 
called, Russia 1918, Anniversary of Red Army. The film was a mixture of old films clips 
showing burning Ukrainian villages during WWI, the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in 
1918, and the duplicitous Germans then occupying Ukraine. Lenin is shown signing the 
document to create the Red Army followed by the Red Army marching into Kiev in 1919. 
The intertitle reads ‘Year 1943 - Long Live 25th Anniversary of the Red Army’ [35]. The 
resonances of 1918 and 1941 are clear, as is the might of the Red Army. In London, 
thousands gathered at the Albert Hall for this celebratory event, which included readings by 
the leading British actors Laurence Olivier and John Gielgud. In Manchester, the IC worked 
with the Lord Mayor’s Anglo-Russian Unity Committee [10] to organise a Red Army Day on 
21st February 1943. The lord mayors of Manchester and Liverpool presided over a 
celebratory event at the Kings Hall in Belle Vue, Manchester. First there were speeches and 
a procession of representatives of the British armed forces and civil defence organisations, 
which were followed by a dramatic pageant at nearby Ardwick Green. The MoI also 
produced posters, and sponsored a Penguin (publishing house) special entitled, 100 
Questions About Russia, which presented extremely positive answers about Russia [16, P. 
100]. The MoI also had exhibitions about aspects of life in the USSR that could be lent to 
RAC and ICs. 
 
The Anglo-Soviet Alliance and Manchester. iii 
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In response to the agreement of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance, friendship committees variously 
called British-Soviet Unity, Anglo-Soviet Unity or Anglo-Soviet Friendship committees were 
set up at civic level across the country. The Lord Mayor of Manchester’s Anglo-Russian 
Friendship Committee (MARFC) was formed on 13th October 1941 at a meeting convened by 
the Lord Mayor, Alderman R. G. Edwards J.P, at the Town Hall and attended by 
representatives of all shades of opinion in the city. The Committee’s objectives were, ‘To 
organise material aid and to foster friendship with our Soviet Ally [1]. One of its first 
initiatives was to organise an Anglo-Soviet Friendship Week, 2nd-9th November 1941, to 
coincide with the anniversary of the birth of the Soviet Union. The MoI and the friendship 
committees had the same aim of raising knowledge and understanding, but the friendship 
committees also had a charitable dimension and raised money to send medical aid and 
warm clothing to Russia. While they were formally separate organisations, the North West 
RAC was eager to work with the any of the new friendship committees that were being set 
up the region.  A North West RAC document noted that such friendship committees were, 
‘Responding to the national desire to demonstrate the friendship of Great Britain for the 
Russian people, and to develop Anglo-Russian relations – and, at the same time, 
demonstrate the vast contribution that Russia is making to the cause of free people in every 
part of the world [28].’ The RAC document noted that it was no part of the MoI’s role to 
form friendship committees but that, ‘we know from experience the value of [the MoI’s] 
meetings, exhibitions, cinema shows and friendship weeks’ and wanted ‘your Committee to 
know that the Ministry can be of service in supplying photographic and other excellent 
publicity material, and possibly films and speakers occasionally to support their valuable 
efforts [28].’  
 
There was overlap in the membership of MARFC and the Manchester IC. In part this is 
because both organisations were recruited from the same types of people and 
organisations: political parties, religious leaders, trade unionists, charity organisations. The 
Town Clerk, who was Manchester’s chief administrative office was a member of the 
Manchester IC and worked closely with the Lord Mayor. MARFC had 18 sub-districts and it is 
also possible to identify overlaps with the MoI at this level as well. For example, Mrs Gladys 
Lord, a former school teacher, conservative party councillor and chair of the Withington 
division MARFC was also a MoI speaker [18, P.3 & 19, P.3]. 
 
The two organisations cooperated in the organisation of exhibitions, demonstrations, 
pageants, concerts, films, lectures, Anglo-Russian Friendship and Aid to Russia weeks. 
Manchester also hosted Ambassador Maisky and Madame Maiskaya. On 26th January 1943 
Madame Maiskaya presented an Album from the women of Moscow’s Trekhgorka Textile 
Mill to the Lord Mayor for the women of Manchester. The event at the Opera House was 
attended by hundreds of women and girls, Mr. George Mould the MoI’s regional officer was 
also in attendance [20, P. 6]. The main trade union committee the Manchester and Salford 
Trades Council (MSTC) supported the Lord Mayor’s Anglo-Soviet Friendship Committee and 
its communist party secretaries first Jack Munro 1941 and then Horace Newbold and were 
also members of the Manchester IC and promoted production for the USSR. In October 
1941 Jack Munro shared a platform with the conservative party Minister of Supply Lord 
Beaverbrook to promote production. The communist trade unionist and the conservative 
businessman was yet another unlikely alliance forged by the war against Nazi Germany. 
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Manchester Divisional Committees: Informing and listening to Mancunians. 
Charles Nowell, the city librarian and honorary secretary of the MIC played a crucial role in 
organising the committee’s work in the city and liaising with the divisional committees (DCs) 
when they were established in 1942. The MoI had a list of speakers who travelled the 
country delivering ‘war commentaries’; these were free public talks by speakers who 
offered their personal insights on a variety of topics. This is another example of the MoI 
using British voices to deliver their messages, it was hoped that the speakers would be 
engaging, authoritative but not party political. In addition to lunch time film shows, Charles 
Nowell organised fortnightly war commentaries on a range of topics not necessarily all 
USSR-related, in Manchester Central Library’s 300-seat theatre. These proved so popular 
that they became weekly events. In order to make the war commentaries more accessible 
to Mancunians the DCs were asked to organise war commentaries in local libraries and 
church halls near where people lived. The ICs and DCs were provided with biographical 
notes about the speakers. Some of these biographical notes have survived, but frustratingly 
copies of the war commentaries actually delivered in Manchester have not been located in 
the local archives. 
 
The MoI speakers who delivered war commentaries in Manchester included people who 
had spent time in Russia – USSR.  Manchester’s Eastern DC was particularly active in 
organising war commentaries, which were usually chaired by the local conservative party 
councillor Mrs Nellie Beer. Miss Kathleen Taylor a journalist who had spent 15 years in 
Russia gave a war commentary on The strength of Russia and Mr Kolni-Balozky, gave one 
simply entitled Russia. On 29th February 1944 Councillor Beer chaired a talk by Rennie Smith 
on Russia at War delivered to an audience of 48. Also, in 1944 Harold Gibson, who had won 
the Military Cross in WWI and in 1922 had been a commissioner for the League of Nations 
Intellectual Commission to Russia and General Director of University Relief, spoke on Life in 
the Soviet Union. Another speaker was Lady Fletcher, who is described as a Russian by birth, 
who had come to Britain shortly after the Russian revolution with her first husband Captain 
Hicks. She is the described as having travelled extensively and as having produced 
summaries of soviet newspapers and books. Curiously, one line in her biography has been 
crossed out and no reason is given. The line states, ‘Lady Fletcher was well-known in 
diplomatic circles and is mentioned in Bruce Lockhart’s books [27].’ Bruce Lockhart was a 
British diplomat and spy who was involved in anti-Bolshevik and British interventionist 
forces during the civil war. 
 
Not all the war commentaries were well-received by all the listeners. Mr Joseph Rabin wrote 
a very long letter of complaint to the liberal party councillor Leonard F. Behrens who was 
the MIC member who had chaired a war commentary delivered by the Scottish authoress 
and traveller Mrs Eileen Bigland. Mrs Bigland who had a Russian mother and was the author 
of books such as, The Riddle of the Kremlin and The Key to the Russian Door. In an interview 
with Mrs Bigland entitled She supped with Stalin [24], she described how ‘I went there 
[USSR] first at the age of twenty, with a copy of Karl Marx and a lot of illusions: I got rid of 
them both. But the more I see of Russia year after year the more vital and promising their 
future seems’. Before the war she had travelled in European Russia and from Siberia to 
Samarkand. Before coming to Manchester she had spent December 1941 travelling Britain 
speaking in support of the Aid for Russia Appeal. The Russian-born Mr Rabin still had 
relatives in the USSR, although at the time they were in the Nazi-occupied area. According 
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to Mr Rabin, Mrs Bigland’s commentary with its comments about bug-ridden houses, erratic 
trains and Stalin arriving for a meal with her with 10-day old soup stains in his moustache, 
‘so far from contributing to a better understanding and a better relationship with the 
Russian people, seemed to me to be almost deliberately calculated to produce a coolness, 
not to say repugnance, among those present who may have been unaware of the facts and 
of the truth and to my mind was, from every point of view, a deplorable disservice in 
present circumstances.’ Rabin describes Stalin as a ‘very great leader ‘. . . probably one of 
the greatest of Russia’s leaders in the whole of her fantastic history . . . ‘and that when 
Kharkov and Stalingrad were threatened by the Nazi armies, ‘whole vast factories, whole 
vast industries and living communities were transplanted to distant Magnitogorsk and other 
places in the Urals, with the miracle of speed and pertinacity, of which no other history, no 
other record, can make comparison . . . [45].’  Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find 
the reply Mr Rabin received to his complaint. 
 
Monitoring public Opinion  
The ICs as well as channelling information from the MoI to the public also had a second role 
of monitoring public opinion. According to Charles Nowell, committee members ‘don’t go 
round seeking information. They rather ‘collect’ public opinion and bring those details which 
they do learn to the notice of their Committee when they feel the national interests would 
best be served in that way [30].’ The questions and unstructured discussions generated by 
public meetings such as the war commentaries were seen as an ideal opportunity for 
committee members to gather opinions [30]. When the decision was taken to set up DCs in 
Manchester, the gathering of information about public opinion within their district was 
described as ‘first in importance’ among their activities [31]. The reasoning for this was that 
each committee member was in touch with different sections of the community and so they 
could inform the committee about, ‘the complaints, criticisms, recommendations and 
suggestions which have been brought to their notice.’ The MoI was very anxious to keep its 
‘finger on the pulse of the people’ and was particularly interested in issues such as, ‘goods in 
short supply, poor quality, high prices, bad distribution; rumours and (especially) how they 
originate; the news, (war news and other) and its presentation, the B.B.C. news and other 
features [31]. It was emphasised that committee members should not ask direct questions 
and that, ‘They should be observers of public opinion rather than creators of it [31].’  
 
The gathering of information about public opinion in Manchester did not always proceed 
smoothly. Charles Nowell complained that public opinion reports were not coming in as 
they should in a large city such as Manchester. The ICs recruited DC committee members 
known as ‘correspondents’ to compile confidential public opinion reports. According to the 
MoI’s Director of Home Intelligence Dr. Stephen Taylor, the reason the MoI adopted this 
method of gathering information about public opinion was due to the Treasury, which 
wanted to ensure that the government was getting a good return for the money it spent on 
campaigns. He noted that while Market Research firms had experience and did provide 
some guidance, their methods were found to be rather slow, so the decision had been taken 
to use ICs to gather public opinion information [23].’ What he does not mention is that the 
correspondents were all unpaid volunteers; the Treasury must have liked the free labour. 
The MoI also specifically rejected the use of modern polling techniques and the actual 
practice of gathering public opinion varied in different ICs. According to Dr. Taylor, ’the aim 
of Home Intelligence was that correspondents should be persons who in the normal course 
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of their lives tend to meet many people every day; they should be reasonably level-headed, 
be capable of putting pen to paper, and have no bees in their bonnets and be capable of 
putting down objectively what reactions of the people they meet have been [23].’ Based on 
the public opinion information gathered by the DCs and ICs, regional weekly reports were 
sent to London, for government ministers, the war office, senior BBC staff and were also 
sent overseas for example to the British Ambassador in Moscow. 
 
The Manchester DCs recorded their public opinion reports on 2-3 sided forms of A4 paper 
with pre-printed questions and space to fill in answers where appropriate. There were quite 
wide variations in how many sections the individual correspondents filled in and how much 
they wrote. The form was headed Confidential its contents were neither published nor 
made public and were passed up the MoI hierarchy. The first question was a general one 
about morale, asking whether people were happier or less content than at the time of the 
last report. Next section asked, ‘What are the events at home or abroad connected to the 
war, which are attracting most interest.’ There was a box below in which the 
correspondents could list the event(s) or factor(s) that were attracting the most attention 
and could indicate what was the ‘General view’ and what was the ‘Minority view’ about it.  
It was often in this section that comments about Russia-related issues were reported. 
 
 Manchester Public Opinion and the Opening of the Second Front in 1942. 
The Manchester DCs were set up and their correspondents began compiling public opinion 
reports in 1942, when the opening of a second front in Europe was the major issue for the 
Anglo-Soviet Alliance. Ambassador Maisky was one of the leading champions of the second 
front and there was significant support for this view in Britain. For example, following the 
Nazi invasion of the USSR Churchill had advocated a raid on France to encourage the 
Germans to deploy more troops in the west. The armed forces chiefs persuaded Churchill 
that such an attack had no chance of success and would be a terrible waste of valuable 
resources, they advised that instead Britain needed to make good the losses incurred in 
France in 1940 and take the necessary time to prepare for an invasion [16, P. 58]. In 1942, 
the British government’s policy was that the second front would have to wait; Britain 
needed to rebuild its fighting capabilities and that the best way to support the USSR was to 
provide it with arms and aid [16, P. 100]. 
 
Confidential public opinion reports compiled in August 1942 reveal that Mancunians’ morale 
was closely linked to the course of the war in the USSR; what comes through is a very strong 
sense that the fate of Britain and the USSR were inextricably linked. When things seemed to 
be going particularly badly, such as when the Germans approached Stalingrad or went into 
the Caucasus, morale worsened. In one report dated 19th August 1942 the only event 
mentioned was, ‘The German advance into the Caucasus’ and the general view was, ‘That it 
may have very serious consequences for Britain as well as Russia.’ A report dated 18th 
August 1942, noted that morale was ‘Less Content. News from Russia more disturbing’ and 
that while the general view was, ‘Admiration for orderly [soviet] withdrawal. Realisation 
that Germany [was] not counting [its] losses.’  
 
 There was a widespread concern about the situation in the USSR, a strong desire to open a 
second front as soon as possible, but also major doubts amongst some that it was a viable 
option. Correspondent N. H.  Booth of Allied Newspapers, reported that people were less 
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content that, ‘they don’t like the look of things in Russia’. That there was, ‘A feeling of real 
crisis with question of a second front in the West in the background. It is impossible to 
summarise opinion on this matter, but while ‘hopes’ are strong. I think it can be safely said 
that people realise that only the highest authority has the information on which to decide.’ 
This view reflects the fear of opening a second front too soon and that there was, ‘Desire for 
[a] second front if possible but doubts as to [the] possibility.’ 
 
Correspondent Reverend Canon A. E. Horner, Rusholme, reported that people were, ‘More 
war weary’ and that the general view of the Second Front was, ‘Stab Germany in the back’.  
A Report dated 17th Aug 1942 stated that the top concern was the, ‘Grave situation in 
Russia’ and that the general concern was, ‘Can Russia hold till winter?’ The second view 
stated in this report was on the, ‘Necessity of opening second front against Germany on the 
Continent’ and the general view was, ‘This is vital to help Russia and end the war as quickly 
as possible.’ A report on 18th August 1942, highlighted the situation in Russia as the main 
concern, and found the general view was that, ‘Second Front desired 1942’ while a minority 
view favoured ‘more bombs on Germany and Italy’.  Another report found a general view on 
the second front was that, ‘Men beyond military age and those in reserved occupations 
enthusiastic for it.’iv That is those who will not have to fight are the champions of a second 
front. Another August report noted that morale was, ‘Rather less content owning to the 
Apparent German successes in Russia.’ The correspondent also noted that, ‘ . . .I would say 
that the Second Front is in the forefront of most peoples’ minds, and many people are very 
anxious that a second front should be opened up as soon as possible’ that people, ‘Do not 
seem to appreciate the reasons for the delay in this and very often the opinion is expressed 
that after all the production etc. we ought to be able to assist [the] Russians by opening up 
[a] front in the west. I have several times heard the view that Japan will very shortly attack 
Russia who will then be in a very precarious position unless we can create a diversion in the 
West.’ 
 
Reports that Churchill was in Moscow [34] in August 1942 were a morale boost for some. A 
report dated 19th August 1942 noted that people were, ‘Happier this week’. The first event 
for people was Churchill’s visit to Moscow, the general view was that, ‘The public are 
cheered by the news, are expecting things to happen now’. This report also mentioned that 
the general view of the Second Front was, ‘Get on with it’ while the minority view was that, 
‘The government will start when ready so why worry.’ 
 
Soviet resistance at Stalingrad was universally admired. A general view in a report on 23rd 
September 1942 was, ‘Admiration and a spur’. A 26th September 1942 report noted that 
people were, ‘Thrilled by [the] spirit of resistance.  General desire to help’.  A report on 28th 
September 1942 noted that the general view was that people were, ‘Hopeful yet doubtful. 
That a common opinion expressed was that, ‘I wish we could do more.’ That a general view 
was that a second front was, ‘Expected, but most people agree it must be left to the 
authorities to decide. While the minority view was that, ‘There should be a ‘Second Front 
Now’, but the correspondent noted ‘these people are mostly Communists.’ In response to 
the part of questionnaire that asks whether the correspondent had heard any comments or 
criticisms on the way the news has been given to the people by the newspapers or the 
B.B.C., he replied, ‘I found much criticism of the presentation by both B.B.C. and Press of 
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campaign news (e.g. Stalingrad) as though a German success was inevitable. The fall of 
Leningrad & Moscow was similarly envisaged last year, but did not happen.’  
 
The confidential Public Opinion Reports were used improve the MoI’s information 
campaigns. By the end of 1942 the Manchester reports, with some reservations, indicated a 
strong desire to open a Second Front as soon as possible. The MoI produced sample 
Questions and Answers on the pressing issues of the day so that IC members at all levels had 
to ‘right’ answer to pass on to the public. Given the widespread concerns about the USSR’s 
ability to hold on and support for a second front, it is understandable that at the end of 
November 1942, the ICs were issued with a sample answer that specifically addressed what 
Britain was doing to aid Russia. The sample answer headed AID TO RUSSIA’ reads: 
 ‘In addition to the supplies sent to Russia, we have relieved her considerably by 
forcing the Germans to maintain a large portion of their forces in the West. We have drawn 
and kept at least 33 German Divisions in the West, and one third of the German bomber 
force is being held there, mainly to repel any land attack by us. Including the Middle East 
and Malta fighting, we are ourselves engaging more than half the whole fighter strength of 
Germany. In addition there are 10 German divisions in Norway, and the main part of the 
German fleet has been for some months tied to the Northern fjords. There are about 350 of 
their best aircraft gathered in the Far North to impede our convoys to Russia. 
 Thus even without invading the continent of Europe, we are taking a considerable 
amount of military pressure off the Russians [22].’  
 
Conclusion: 
The formation of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance was a life-line for the British people and they 
knew this well. The government for its part was keen to overcome any residual concerns or 
reservations about forming an alliance with Stalin and the USSR. The Ministry of Information 
became adept at fostering the image of Anglo-Soviet friendship, while seeking to counter 
sentiments, such as a call for a second front in 1942 that might damage Britain’s chances of 
emerging victorious from the war.  In Manchester, a city that had experienced the blitz in 
December 1940 [21] relief in the Anglo-Soviet Alliance was also touched with a strong sense 
that something had to be done to ‘help Russia’. Public Opinion Reports from August 1942 
reveal the depth of concern and the strong emotions that were generated by the progress 
of the war in the USSR.  
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i Ministry of Information documents from the Manchester archives are stored in boxes 
beginning with the code M77/. 
ii Film No. 8 produced by the British Universities Film & Video Council. Images of the Soviet 
Union at War 1941-1945.  http://bufc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/learnmore/videos-and-dvds., 
explores the role played by British newsreels in creating and reflecting the growth of pro-
Russian feeling in Britain during the Second World War.  
 
iii For a detailed discussion of other aspects of Manchester and the Anglo-Soviet alliance, 
including the Lords Mayors Anglo-Russian Unity Committee, funding raising, exhibitions and 
events see: Danks, Catherine. Your fight is our fight: The Anglo-Soviet alliance during World 
War II // SPb gos universitet. Trudy Kafedry Istorii Novogo i Noveishego vremeni, 2015. No. 
15. - c.118-138.  
 
iv Reserved occupations were considered vital to the war effort on the home front and so 
those employed in them were not subject to conscription. 
 
 
